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     Currently many cellular networks operate using the 
Long Term Evolution (LTE) protocol. Therefore, most 
mobile subscribers interact with LTE on a daily basis, 
and thus are affected by the security standards and 
mechanisms it implements. Here, we propose a 
vulnerability within the LTE protocol: the mobility 
management control signaling, which dictates how a 
user equipment (UE) synchronizes with an enhanced 
Node-B (eNodeB) to prevent intersymbol interference. 
Presented are the implications and the overall effects on 
the bit error rate (BER) of falsified signaling which 
forces a UE to incorrectly advance or delay its uplink 
timing. Specifically, we derive a lower bound on the 
BER for UE that is subjected to the aforementioned 
signaling. Our simulation results show that a non-zero 
BER can be guaranteed regardless of noise conditions. 
Finally, we propose encryption of this signaling to 
prevent such an attack. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Exploring and identifying Long Term Evolution 
(LTE) denial of service (DoS) methodologies is nothing 
new. In essence, the fundamental idea behind a DoS 
attack is to prevent a user, or users, from utilizing their 
device as it was designed to be used. DoS attacks are 
defined by two parameters: the amount of malicious 
traffic load generated and the impact of the attack, also 
known as the scope of the attack [1]. Here, traffic load 
can be thought of as the amount of effort required to 
implement the attack and scope is the number of 
affected users. One example of a DoS attack is classic 
radio jamming. Radio jamming is a deliberate use of 
interfering radio signals sent from one or more 
transmitters to garble emissions from other transmitters 
in order to make them unintelligible at reception [2]. In 
this method of DoS, the transmitted signal is subjected 
to artificially created noise to disrupt the signal’s 
integrity, thereby denying the receiver an exact copy of 
the transmitted signal and making the received signal 
useless. The case of classic radio jamming can be 
qualified as high traffic load and high scope per the 
model presented by [1]. One notable aspect of radio 
jamming is that it usually is not used to target individual 
user equipment (UE). Radio jamming affects all users in 
a given area (i.e., high scope). Basic electromagnetic 
theory tells us that the closer a user is to the source of 
the jamming transmitter, the more affected they are by 
the jamming. However, in general, a malicious actor has 
less control over who and what they affect by employing 
a radio jamming DoS attack. Also, a radio jamming 
attack requires the affected user/users to be close to the 
transmitter. As soon as the affected user moves far 
enough away from the transmitter, they are no longer 
affected by the attack. 
In this work we draw attention to a novel method of 
DoS in mobility managed networks. The proposed 
vulnerability leverages control signaling, normally used 
to ensure proper time alignment of UE uplink frames 
[3], in order to intentionally create misalignment. The 
misaligned uplink frames create intersymbol 
interference (ISI) and subsequently increase a UE bit 
error rate (BER). The traffic load requirement of this 
vulnerability is low, just a single packet containing 
falsified control signaling is required. The scope of the 
attack is also localized to the recipient of the falsified 
control signaling with minimal second-order effects. 
The proposed vulnerability is unique in that the physical 
signals themselves do not need to be overwhelmed, such 
as in classical jamming. Rather it takes advantage of 
how the protocol’s structure requires devices to 
synchronize with a radio access point, termed enhanced 
Node-B (eNodeB) in the LTE protocol. Among other 
functions, the eNodeB is responsible for transmitting the 
downlink signal, and receiving the uplink signal to and 
from the handset (i.e., UE) [4]. This paper investigates 
the subject vulnerability given the current status of the 
LTE protocol due to its ubiquitous implementation 
worldwide. However, we note that the vulnerability is 
generally applicable to any wireless network that 
implements time division multiple access and mobility 
management. 







The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, 
we introduce the subject novel vulnerability. Second, we 
provide a theoretical lower bound on an affected UE’s 
BER. Third, we leverage simulations using the Monte 
Carlo technique to complement the analysis and provide 
further insight into how a UE might be affected. Finally, 
we put forth a proposed amendment to the standard that 
would nullify the effect of this vulnerability.  
     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
First, we present a review of the salient aspects of LTE. 
Next, we introduce the proposed vulnerability and its 
theoretical effects. The preceding analysis is then 
complemented and further illuminated by the presented 
simulated results. Finally, we extend the results with a 
discussion of their interpretation in the context of LTE-
specific mechanisms such as the cyclic prefix and 




          First, we will motivate the discussion by briefly 
discussing some fundamental technologies and theory 
that LTE implements. Next, we will discuss how the 
UE-eNodeB synchronization process works according 
to technical specifications as well as introducing the 
mechanism for mobility management. Lastly, we 
introduce the proposed vulnerability in detail and 
provide a theoretical analysis of its effect.  
 
2.1 Mobility Management in LTE 
 
     Modern LTE architecture attempts to optimize 
resource efficiency by servicing as many customers as 
possible. In order to do that, a working group by the 
name of Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
was formed. 3GPP is the governing body of LTE 
standards and is responsible for issuing technical 
specifications. 3GPP is accountable for dictating how 
mechanisms such as mobility management are 
implemented.  
    LTE implements a technology referred to as 
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) 
where each UE is assigned a resource block 
corresponding to a specific frequency and time slot. 
Setting the frequency component aside, the width of 
each resource block is one millisecond [5]. Because the 
computers are required to work with such small units of 
time, they must also maintain high levels of timing 
accuracy in order to function properly and prevent the 
smearing of individual pulses (i.e., symbols) and 
subsequently overlaping in time (i.e., ISI) [6].  Because 
frames propagate at the speed of light, small changes in 
relative distance from one another can have significant  
 
Figure 1: The UE is handed over between each 
eNodeB as it enters and exits new service areas. 
 
impacts on the UE-eNodeB synchronization and the 
amount of induced ISI.  
     The designation given to the UE-eNodeB 
synchronization process is random access, in which a 
UE can request to connect to the network at any time, 
thus the use of the terminology random [3]. The 
necessity for UE to be synchronized with an eNodeB is 
driven by the need for UE to be mobile. As the UE 
moves around, it is handed off from one eNodeB to 
another as observed in Figure 1. Due to the movement 
of the UE, the transmitted symbols take different 
amounts of time to get from the UE to the eNodeB. The 
time it takes for a bit to traverse the distance from the 
UE to the eNodeB depends on the relative distance 
between the two. For example, in Figure 1 we can see 
that the UE remains mostly on the fringe of service area 
1, however by the time it reaches service area 3, it is 
much closer to the eNodeB as demonstrated by the 
shorter arrow length extending from the transmission 
path to the eNodeB. Because the distance between the 
transmission path and the eNodeB changes, so too will 
the time it takes for the uplink frame to reach the 
eNodeB. 
     This time-domain synchronization is managed by a 
specific command element in the control signaling 
called the timing advance (TA). In order for the UE to 
acquire its initial TA command, it must undergo the 
random-access process as specified in [3] and 
summarized in [4]. First, the UE transmits (uplink) a 
random-access preamble that allows the eNodeB to 
approximate the UE timing. Second, based on step 1, the 
eNodeB issues a TA to the UE to better adjust the UE 
timing. Additionally, the eNodeB assigns time and 
frequency resources to the UE. Third, the UE requests 
to connect to the network. Last, if necessary, the 






Figure 2: Legacy TA command (top) and release 
10+ TA (bottom) [3]. 
 
trying to access the same time-frequency resource. 
Otherwise, the eNodeB will grant the UE access to the 
network. 
     Now that the UE is connected to the network, it must 
maintain synchronization with the servicing eNodeB to 
ensure that its uplink frames are arriving when the 
eNodeB is expecting them. The official purpose of the 
TA is to control advancing or delaying the uplink 
transmission timing to the UE [7]. Recall that our UE is 
assigned a specific time slot in the resource block while 
the other time slots in the resource block are assigned to 
other UEs. Therefore, if transmissions are sent at the 
wrong time, they will start to interfere with other frames. 
In this case, the frames are out of alignment causing ISI. 
Additionally, other users with neighboring frames are 
also affected by this misalignment. To rectify this issue, 
the eNodeB transmits a TA command to the UE, telling 
it when to transmit its frames so that they arrive in the 
designated time slot in which the eNodeB expects to 
receive them.  
     Before the structure of the TA is discussed, it is 
important to know that the basic unit of time in LTE is 
Ts ≈ .33 nanoseconds [8]. The most frequent form of the 
TA is a series of eight bits: the first two of which are 
used to identify the TA group (TAG), and the last six 
correspond to values 0 to 63 as seen in Figure 2. Each 
bit represents one unit of time Ts. Using this series of 
bits, the UE is told when to transmit its uplink signal. 
The actual increment of time the TA represents is 
dependent upon the previous timing adjustment, NTA,old. 
By normalizing NTA,old to zero, the present timing 
adjustment, NTA,new, can vary from -.161 µsec to .137 
µsec indicating delaying or advancing the uplink 
transmission timing, respectively [7].  
     The TAG mentioned above is implemented to 
manage the UE TA when the UE supports multiple 
component carriers (CC), possibly from multiple 
servicing cells. In other words, the UE is transmitting 
and/or receiving using multiple carriers simultaneously.  
In this case, the TA associated with each CC may need 
 
Figure 3: True Uplink Symbols and the effect of 
tampering with the Timing Advance mechanism. 
 
to be different depending on, for example, how many  
unique servicing cells there are. Thus, the TAG 
delineates which TA is associated with each CC. In the 
case of the same servicing cell, there is one TAG 
associated with multiple CC. On the other hand, if there 
are multiple servicing cells, then there will be multiple 
TAGs, each associating a TA to a specific servicing cell 
[9].  
     The legacy TA (used in LTE releases 8 and 9) does 
not make use of the first two bits, as seen in Figure 2. 
However, in releases 10 through 14, which are 
synonymous with LTE-Advanced (LTE-A), the subject 
bits are used to indicate the TAG. As customer resource 
demand continues to rise and 5G technologies such as 
heterogeneous networks start to phase into society, the 
TAG is becoming a more important factor in the overall 
TA [10].  
 
2.2 Proposed Vulnerability 
 
     The proposed vulnerability intentionally induces ISI 
by sending a falsified TA command outlined in Figure 
2. This disrupts and degrades the ability of the UE to 
interface with the larger network, thereby rendering the 
user unable to communicate. 
     The disruptive ISI-inducing command causes the UE 
to shift when it transmits its uplink frame as seen in 
Figure 3. The result of this shift causes symbols to 
interfere with one another. 
     Furthermore, this vulnerability is user-specific. 
During the aforementioned random-access procedure, 
the eNodeB assigns the UE a unique identifier used for 
signaling purposes called the Cell-Radio Network 
Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI) [4]. The C-RNTI can be 
thought of as a digital address for the UE. Because each 
UE in the servicing area of the eNodeB receives all 
downlink transmissions from the eNodeB, each UE uses 
its assigned C-RNTI to know which signals to pay 





Figure 4: Visualization of ISI and its effects on 
error rate. 
 
important is that the proposed DoS vulnerability 
requires observation of the UE’s random-access 
procedure in order to associate the C-RNTI with the UE 
[10]. 
     Since this method relies on symbols overlapping one 
another, the technique requires an adjacent user’s 
symbols to overlap with. Here, the unintended, second-
order effect due to induced ISI is best understood using 
Figure 3. Not only will the induced ISI affect an 
attacker’s intended target, but it will also have an equal 
effect on the second frame.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Degradation in high SNR 
      Environments 
 
     To provide an analysis of the effect of the 
vulnerability we consider the standard additive white 
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel where the received 
signal 𝑟(𝑡) is the original uplink signal 𝑠(𝑡) corrupted 




     The uplink signal is a randomly generated series of 
bits, modulated via quadrature phase shift keying 
(QPSK). QPSK modulation provides for the best-case 
scenario in terms of BER. By employing a QPSK 
scheme in our study, we give the benefit of the doubt to 
the BER results, while still demonstrating the potency 
of the vulnerability. Additionally, we are in effect 
bounding the lower limit of the BER. By implementing 
other modulation schemes, we would expect to observe 
even poorer BER behavior.  
     The AWGN is dependent upon the specified bit-
energy-to-noise ratio (Eb/No). Eb/No provides a 
measure of the energy per bit relative to the noise floor 
[11]. 
     Further, Eb/No is a normalized version of signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR), which is used more often when 
referring to the digital environment since it allows 
comparison of performance across modulation schemes 
with different size symbol dictionaries.  
    To begin our derivation of a lower bound on BER 
consider an idealized scenario where 𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑠(𝑡) (i.e., a 
noiseless channel). In this best-case scenario, the 
theoretical BER is zero. However, if ISI is introduced 
via the proposed vulnerability a minimum BER is 
guaranteed which depends on the magnitude of induced 
ISI. Utilizing Figure 4 and applying the law of total 
probability, we can show that for a noiseless 
environment the theoretical symbol error rate (SER) for 
a given amount of ISI is 
 
where 𝑛 is an integer number of symbols experiencing 
ISI and 𝑘 is the total number of transmitted symbols. In 
Figure 4, we demonstrate the case where the original 
transmitted symbol is in the first quadrant (“11”). Then, 
another symbol is randomly generated with equal 
probability and subsequently added to the original 
transmission symbol (i.e. ISI). Through this process, we 
now have four possible scenarios, which are indicated 
by the numbered circles. The color green indicates no 
error, and the color red indicates a symbol error. All 
possible scenarios are represented by the total area in the 
circles, which is *+
,
. The area occupied in red, 
representing symbol error, is -
,
. Now, to quantify the 
SER, we divide the red area (error) by the total area (all 
possible scenarios), and multiply by the magnitude of 
the symbol overlap (	.
/
	) which results in (2). Clearly, 
the case where 𝑛 > 𝑘 is not possible, hence the 
associated inequality. The basis of (2) is the noiseless 
environment where we assume that every symbol 
received is exactly as it was transmitted, due to the low 
levels of noise.  Additionally, we make the assumption 
that the false control signaling which causes the UE to 
transmit early or late is properly received. This last 
assumption could be relaxed by including a probability 
of reception of the malicious packet. However, for a 
noiseless environment, the BER is less than or equal to 




     Therefore, the analysis also shows that the BER is 
lower-bounded by (3) regardless of the actual noise 
level in the UE-eNodeB channel. Any further 
degradation of the BER will be solely a function of 𝑛(𝑡).  
( ) ( ) ( ).        (1)r t s t n t= +














Figure 5: Bit error rate as a function of Eb/No 
given a specified number of ISI symbols. 
 
3. Simulation and Results 
 
3.1 Simulation Environment and Parameters 
 
     ISI was modeled by randomly generating frame 
content and summing the first portion of the true uplink 
symbols with the overlapping symbols as seen in red in 
Figure 3. The remaining portion of the symbols is 
untouched. Finally, after the induced ISI all symbols 
were passed through (1). Implementing AWGN allowed 
observation of the effects on BER as a function of both 
ISI and noise. Finally, 𝑟(𝑡) was compared to 𝑠(𝑡), 
allowing calculation of the SER/BER. 
     During this research, we used a randomly generated 
frames of 4096 bits (i.e., 2048 symbols) where ones and 
zeros were generated with equal probability. To model 
the effects of modifying the signal timing, selected 
values of ISI, 𝑛 = [16, 64, 256, 1024, 2048], were 
chosen. Each of these values of 𝑛 represents the number 
of frame symbols experiencing ISI. Because QPSK is 
used, the total frame length is 2048 symbols (i.e., 2 bits 
per symbol). Therefore, 𝑛 = 2048 symbols represents 
the case where two frames arrive at the eNodeB 
simultaneously (i.e., complete ISI). For values larger 
than 2048 we would expect that the overall BER start to 
decrease since a smaller number of symbols are 
affected. By varying the magnitude of induced ISI, 𝑛, 
we were able to observe the marginal effects it has on 
BER. Additionally, to make the model more realistic, 
we included AWGN with levels between -15 dB and 10 
dB in 1 dB increments.  
     The model does not account for coding schemes, the 
cyclic prefix, or use of higher-order modulation 
schemes. The authors plan to implement these 
techniques in future research in order to more  
 
Figure 6: Bit Error Rate as a function of ISI given 
a specified Eb/No. 
 
accurately model the effect in modern communication 
schemes.  
 
3.2 Results of the Simulation 
 
     In Figure 5, we have plotted the results of our 
simulation as well as the theoretical instance for zero 
ISI. We show the BER behavior as function of 
magnitude of induced ISI and Eb/No. First, note that 
nearly identical to the theoretical BER is the simulated 
case in which we did not implement any ISI. Of note, as 
Eb/No approaches zero, the BER performance 
converges to the theoretical limit of 0.5. This outcome 
suggests that for very noisy environments, noise is the 
dominant factor in BER performance. In other words, 
depending on the severity of noise in the channel, the 
presented DoS vulnerability may have little impact on 
BER. This low Eb/No environment is the exact outcome 
desired by a radio jamming DoS attack. Excluded are 
cases greater than 10 dB because the BER does not vary 
significantly with incremental changes of Eb/No for all 
values of ISI.  
    Referring to the left-hand side of Figure 5, one can 
see that the grouping of the BER curves is much tighter. 
This is due to the signal experiencing a low SNR. In this 
region, the true uplink transmission is affected mostly 
by noise, however there is a marginal effect due to the 
ISI at low Eb/No levels as denoted by the slight, 
incremental spacing between the lines. As the Eb/No 
value increases, the contours begin to diverge, 
indicating that, the BER becomes more dependent on 
the magnitude of the ISI.  
     As Eb/No continues to increase, the graphs heads-in 
two distinct directions. In one direction, there is no ISI, 
while in the other there exists ISI. In the case of zero ISI, 





Figure 7: Bit Error Rate limit as a function of ISI 
for extremely low levels of noise. 
 
for non-zero ISI values, the BER approaches non-zero 
values, confirming that the proposed vulnerability can 
guarantee a non-zero BER regardless of the channel 
quality. 
     The vulnerability makes the most significant 
difference in the region where Eb/No is greater than 7 
dB. Here, the BER curves indicating non-zero ISI 
performance begins to behave asymptotically. This is 
due to near-perfect reception of symbols not 
experiencing ISI while bits being represented with 
symbols under ISI are being flipped with probability 
one-half. 
     Moreover, as the number of ISI symbols increases, 
the less effect noise has on the overall outcome of the 
BER as demonstrated by the relative flatness of the 
contours.  For example, the line closest to the top of 
graph, indicating complete ISI (i.e., entire frame 
overlap), has a much flatter contour than the orange line 
indicating 16 ISI symbols. In cases where the noise level 
is undetermined, larger quantities of ISI symbols can 
guarantee a high BER irrespective of noise conditions. 
For example, given an ISI symbol magnitude of 2048, 
the BER at -15dB is 0.4305, and as the quality of the 
noise environment improves, the simulated BER 
approaches 0.2500 at 10 dB and greater. On the other 
hand, an ISI symbol count of 16 symbols yields a BER 
of 0.4004 at -15 dB, and as the noise environment 
improves the simulated BER approaches 0.0020 at 10 
dB. Therefore, with high ISI little change in BER is 
noted over a large change in Eb/No. Alternatively, with 
little ISI much larger changes in BER are noted over the 
same large range of Eb/No. Therefore, for unknown 
channel conditions, high ISI guarantees the most 
consistent BER. These results are also shown in Figure 
7, but from a different perspective. The theoretical 
values of BER, given no ISI are plotted in red asterisks. 
Selecting four values of Eb/No allows us to demonstrate 
Table 1: Simulated Bit Error Rate (BER) vs. 
Theoretical BER.  






0 0 0 
16 0.0020 0.0020 
64 0.0077 0.0078 
256 0.0311 0.0312 
1024 0.1248 0.1250 
2048 0.2500 0.2500 
 
the dependency of BER on ISI symbols. Again, given 
an ISI magnitude of 2048, the BER does not vary greatly 
as demonstrated by the behavior of the contours on the 
right-hand side of the graph. However, on the left-hand 
side of the graph, where there is no ISI introduced, we 
can see the large fluctuation in BER as a result of only 
noise. As expected, the greater the noise, the greater the 
BER.  
     Lastly, Table 1 compares the theoretical BER from 
(3) to the simulated BER with values rounded to four 
decimal places. In every case, the simulated BER 
approximately equal to the theoretical BER. Recall from 
the analysis that we were able to bound the lower limit 
of the BER using (3) for a given number of ISI symbols. 
Thus, what the simulation provides, supports the theory. 
The reason for the minute discrepancy is that the 
simulated results are all subjected to noise, albeit in very 
small amounts, while the theoretical values assume no 
noise. Complementing Table 1, the results in Figure 7 
depict the information in a graphical format to further 
highlight this trend. The line represents (3) above and 
the theoretical values from Table 1, while the red 
asterisks are the simulated values from Table 1. As you 
can see, the model very nearly reproduces the theoretical 
BER for each value of 𝑛. The actual simulated BER for 
zero ISI is 5∙10-6 which the authors approximate in Table 
1 as zero.  
 
3.3 Implications for LTE 
 
     When considering the implications of the above 
simulations in LTE a few key factors are noted. Perhaps 
most important is the lack of a cyclic prefix in the 
simulation. In order to reduce ISI, the current LTE 
standard implements a cyclic prefix to the frame 
structure. The cyclic prefix is used to reduce ISI caused 
by time dispersion as a result of multiple transmission 
paths [12]. Time dispersion occurs when the same signal 
is received starting at two different times, potentially 
creating a situation where the end of one frame 
overwrites the beginning of another frame. Therefore, 
the cyclic prefix replicates the end of the frame and 
places it at the beginning of the frame [4]. Based on the 




of ISI will be reduced and BER will drop. We suspect 
that there will be a minimum number of ISI symbols 
needed to introduce guaranteed levels of BER. 
Introducing any ISI less than the minimum may have 
little effect at all on the BER.  However, more research 
needs to be conducted in order to quantify the outcome 
and effectiveness of the cyclic prefix. 
     Lastly, this simulation implemented a QPSK 
modulation scheme. Higher-order modulation schemes 
are used in LTE and should be considered in future 
work. Additionally, simulation of the physical layer can 
be extended to include multiplexing, specifically 
OFDM. OFDM is unique in that it divides a single 
channel into many subchannels so that multiple symbols 
are transmitted in parallel [13]. 
      
4. Conclusion 
 
     This paper has proposed an innovative DoS 
technique that simulations show would effectively 
generate user-specific ISI, with minimal second-order 
effects. Specifically, we have evaluated the current LTE 
mobility management climate and demonstrated within 
it, a flaw, which is susceptible to exploitation. Due to its 
lack of security, the TA mechanism that is intended to 
shield against ISI, actually makes it possible to create 
intentional uplink signal interference. Additionally, 
we’ve shown what the effects on the BER would be 
under these circumstances. Furthermore, we’ve 
demonstrated the ability of an assured non-zero BER 
given any amount of environmental noise. Most 
importantly, this deficiency extends beyond LTE and 
into the wider scope of technologies implementing 
unencrypted time division multiple access control. Here, 
we’ve only demonstrated the effects on a narrow portion 
of the overall picture. 
     We submit that relevant governing bodies, such as 
3GPP, consider encryption of such signaling. Doing so 
would prevent a would-be attacker from crafting a 
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